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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joseph Richard Clinton appeals from his sentence for Lewd Conduct with 
a Minor Under 16. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Clinton lured seven year old N.C. into his trailer house by inviting N.C. and 
her four year old brother inside to see his puppies. (PSI, pp.1_2.1) N.C.'s brother 
did not enter the trailer because he was scared. (PSI, p.2.) Clinton played 
"freeze tag" with N.C. and he touched N.C.'s vaginal area, skin to skin. (PSI, 
pp.2-3.) After N.C. left Clinton's trailer, Clinton went into his bedroom and 
masturbated. (PSI, p.3.) Clinton told law enforcement officers that he felt he 
needed treatment because it helped with "the urges." (PSI, p.3.) "Clinton 
admitted being attracted to children and said he fantasized about little girls all of 
the time." (PSI, p.3.) 
A grand jury indicted Clinton for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16. 
(R., pp.24-25.) The state sought a persistent violator sentencing enhancement 
based on Clinton's prior conviction for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16.2 (R., 
pp.41-42.) Clinton's trial counsel moved to have Clinton committed based on the 
competency evaluation Dr. Beaver performed, which indicated that Dr. Beaver 
had reservations about Clinton's competency to stand trial. (R., pp.47-4S; S/30/10 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"ClintonPSI.pdf." 
2 Clinton pled guilty to having anal/genital contact with an eight year old boy on 2 
or 3 occasions. (PSI, pp.115-16.) During the investigation of that crime, Clinton 
"told police he molested about fifty (50) children in a hundred different situations." 
(PSI, p.g.) 
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Psychological/Competency Evaluation, p.8.) Thereafter, Dr. Beaver reviewed a 
videotape of Clinton's interview with law enforcement officers and audio 
recordings of Clinton's phone calls from jail. (10/13/10 
Psychological/Competency Evaluation Amended Report, pp.2-3.) Based on this 
additional information, Dr. Beaver concluded that Clinton was competent to stand 
trial because Clinton "did not appear to be as significantly impaired with regard to 
his memory abilities and episodes of confusion" as Dr. Beaver first observed 
when he examined Clinton. (Id. at 3-4.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Clinton pled guilty to Lewd Conduct with a 
Minor Under 16 and the state dismissed the persistent violator enhancement. (R., 
pp.57-64; Tr., p.11, LA - p.13, L.13; p.16, Ls.1-3.) The state agreed to 
recommend a 25 year sentence with three years fixed, and either probation or a 
period of retained jurisdiction if Clinton's psychosexual evaluation indicated that 
he was amendable to treatment. (Tr., p.13, L.15 - p.14, L.7.) The district court 
ordered a psychosexual evaluation and a social/sexual assessment and Clinton's 
trial counsel stipulated to providing Clinton's prior competency evaluations to the 
psychosexual evaluator.3 (PSI, pp.8, 15-36; R., pp.65-66; Tr., p.34, L.23 - p.35, 
L.22.) The psychosexual evaluation and the social/sexual assessment were both 
provided to the district court prior to sentencing. (PSI, p.8.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed and ordered the 
sentence executed. (R., pp.68-69; Tr., p.53, L.24 - p.54, L.3.) The district court 
3 Clinton is not challenging the use of his competency evaluations in the 
presentence process on appeal because he waived his Fifth Amendment rights 
prior to sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
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"specifically recommend[ed] that the Defendant participate in Sex Offender 
treatment while incarcerated." (R., p.69; Tr., p.54, Ls.22-25.) Clinton filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment. (R., pp.71-73.) Clinton filed a timely 
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., 
p.75; Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2 
(augmentation).) Clinton also filed a second /'C.R. 35 Motion, which the district 
court denied. (Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35 
(augmentation)l 
4 Clinton is not challenging the denial of either of his I.C.R. 35 Motions on appeal 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
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ISSUES 
Clinton states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest 
disregard for the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte 
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Clinton prior to 
sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of twenty years, with three years fixed, 
upon Mr. Clinton following his plea of guilty to lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Clinton did not request a separate I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation 
and the district court did not order one. Has Clinton failed to claim or 
demonstrate fundamental error in sentencing? 
2. Has Clinton failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Clinton Has Failed To Claim Or Demonstrate Fundamental Error In Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Clinton underwent a psychosexual evaluation, a competency evaluation, 
and a social/sexual assessment prior to sentencing. (PSI, pp.15-36; 8/30/10 
Psychological/Competency Evaluation, pp.1-9.) Clinton argues that the district 
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 by not ordering a separate mental health 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-15.) This argument 
fails because it was not preserved by objection and Clinton has not claimed, 
much less shown, that the asserted error is fundamental. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 
457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the 
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 
979 (2010). Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Clinton to 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
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whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry. 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. 
C. Clinton Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Psychological 
Evidence Before The Court At Sentencing 
Clinton claims that the district court erred by not ordering an additional 
psychological exam prior to sentencing, asserting that appellate review is 
appropriate because there has been an alleged "manifest disregard" of a 
procedural rule. (Appellant's brief, p.6.) While there is authority from the Idaho 
Court of Appeals allowing such review, see, ~, State v. Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 
442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Supreme Court has recently 
called such authority into doubt. In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 
961, 978 (2010), the Court stated that "where an error has occurred at trial and 
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be 
reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his 
unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated." The language of the Idaho 
Supreme Court is unambiguous. Unpreserved claims of error "shall only be 
reviewed" on appeal if the record shows a plain violation of a defendant's 
"unwaived constitutional rights." As such, Clinton must demonstrate that the 
error he claims is fundamental under the test employed by Idaho Supreme Court 
because Clinton did not request an additional psychological evaluation or object 
to the lack of such an evaluation prior to or at the time of sentencing. 
Clinton has failed to show fundamental error. He has failed to show that 
the type or nature of the psychological evaluation considered at sentencing is of 
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constitutional significance. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that a different evaluation than the ones conducted prior to sentencing would 
have had any effect on the ultimate sentence imposed. 
Even if psychological evaluations at sentencing hearings are somehow 
exempt from the Idaho Supreme Court's declaration that only fundamental error 
will be reviewed in the absence of an objection, the record shows that there was 
no manifest disregard for the rules and statutes governing such evaluations. In 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1982), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that regardless of fundamental error "[m]anifest 
disregard" of I.C.R. 32 "could not be countenanced on appeal without diminishing 
the reputation of the judicial process." The appellate court could therefore review 
for manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 "in order to protect the integrity of the courts." 
kL "However, we will not review a contention, made for the first time on appeal, 
that compliance with the rule was simply inadequate - e.g., that the [PSI] report 
should have developed a particular point further, or that certain information was 
incomplete or inaccurate. Those are matters to be raised at the sentencing 
hearing." kL at 566-67, 650 P.2d at 708-09. Review of the record shows no 
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 because Clinton's claim goes 
only to the adequacy of the evaluations, not whether there was manifest 
disregard of the applicable law. 
Idaho Code § 19-2522( 1) states that "[i]f there is reason to believe the 
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for 
good cause shown," the court must appoint a psychiatrist or psychologist to 
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evaluate and report upon the defendant's mental condition to inform the court's 
sentencing decision. That statute also states that the report of the examination 
must include the following: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
I. C. § 19-2522(3). 
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal 
Rule 32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. 
These elements include information on the health of the defendant where 
relevant to the sentencing decision, I.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the 
presentence investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a 
psychological examination, I.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 
817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010). "A psychological evaluation is 
not required in every case where the defendant claims some mental illness or 
disability." kl "Rather, the decision of whether to obtain a psychological 
evaluation lies within the sentencing court's discretion." kl (citing I.C.R. 32(d); 
State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008); State 
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v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188,189,45 P.3d 844,845 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Jones, 
132 Idaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999». "As with any discretionary 
determination, however, the district court's action must be consistent with the 
applicable legal standards." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879, 876 P.2d 
158, 161 (Ct. App. 1994). "A district court's election not to order a psychological 
evaluation will be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there 
was no reason to believe a defendant's mental condition would be a significant 
factor at sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately met 
the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d 
at 1184. 
Clinton claims that "the materials before the district court did not function 
as an adequate substitute for a full I. C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Clinton only specifically identifies two of the statutory 
requirements he claims were omitted from the evaluations. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.13-14 (claiming there was no evaluation of "whether treatment is available for 
the defendant's mental condition" and there was no "analysis of the relative risks 
and benefits of treatment or nontreatment.,,5) Clinton's complaint merely goes to 
the adequacy of the evaluation, and therefore may not be brought for the first 
time on appeal. Toohill, 103 at 566-67, 650 P.2d at 708-09 (contentions that 
compliance with the rule was inadequate must be raised at the sentencing 
hearing). Furthermore, Clinton has failed to demonstrate that the district court 
5 Clinton mostly asserts that the district court drew incorrect conclusions from the 
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) Whether the sentencing court drew 
correct conclusions at sentencing is a different question from whether the district 
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 by not ordering a new evaluation. 
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erred by not ordering an additional psychological evaluation prior to sentencing 
under either the fundamental error standard or the manifest disregard standard. 
The record establishes that the district court had ample information about 
Clinton's psychological condition. 
In Clinton's PSI, the presentence investigator summarized Clinton's 
physical and mental health condition. (PSI, pp.7-B.) Clinton reported that he 
thought he was in good health, but he felt that "being very hard of hearing limited 
his activities." (PSI, p.7.) Clinton stated that he was involved in sex offender 
counseling "a long time ago" and he indicated that he thought he could benefit 
from counseling again. (PSI, p.7.) The presentence investigator noted that it was 
difficult communicating with Clinton because of Clinton's "inability to hear well." 
(PSI, p.7.) As part of the presentence investigation process, Clinton was 
assessed with the Level of Service Inventory Revised ("LSI-R"). (PSI, p.10.) 
According to Clinton's results on that test, some identified risk factors that may 
contribute to his criminal behavior include "unstructured use of leisure/recreation 
time; emotional/personal issues; limited education and lack of employment; poor 
financial situation; and attitude/orientation." (PSI, p.10.) The presentence 
investigator reviewed Clinton's earlier PSI, which stated that Clinton was "not 
amienable [sic] to any kind of therapy. He is not intellectually able to gain insight 
or make behavioral changes." (PSI, pp.7-B.) The earlier PSI also stated that 
Clinton "is a threat to children in the general public." (PSI, p.B.) 
The presentence investigator summarized Clinton's psychosexual 
evaluation and his social/sexual assessment and recommended that "a lengthy 
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period of incarceration would protect society, deter Mr. Clinton from sexually 
offending children, hold him accountable for his actions against this victim, and 
provide the opportunity for Mr. Clinton to participate in counseling and treatment 
in a secure environment." (PSI, pp.8-10.) The presentence investigator did not 
give any indication that additional psychological testing was necessary, which is 
reasonable considering the extensive psychological evaluations that were 
performed prior to sentencing. (See PSI, p.10-11 (discussing "Treatment 
Programs andlor Optional Recommendations").) 
The first psychological evaluation was performed by Dr. Beaver in order to 
determine whether Clinton was competent to stand trial. (8/30/10 
PsychologicallCompetency Evaluation, p.1.) Over the course of three days, Dr. 
Beaver interviewed Clinton and Clinton underwent a psychometric test battery 
that included 16 separate psychological tests. (Id. at 1-2.) 
After performing these tests, Dr. Beaver thoroughly discussed Clinton's 
physical and mental condition: 
Richard Clinton was seen and evaluated in a conference 
range of motion at the Ada County Jail. He ambulated somewhat 
slowly but independently. He had to be escorted to and from the 
testing room reportedly because he could not locate it by himself. 
He does wear eyeglasses. He does wear a hearing aid that he 
switches back and forth between his ears. His basic personal 
hygiene and grooming appeared adequate. 
During the course of interviewing and testing, he was alert 
but very distractible. He presented with very poor hearing, which 
resulted in instructions having to be repeated several times. He 
also would often present as if he understood what was being said 
but it would become quite clear that he had little understanding. 
Even when he appeared to understand a basic instruction, he was 
not always successful in following through and responding, 
meandering in his behavior. Expressively, he could communicate 
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his basic thoughts and ideas but did have some articulation 
problems at times because of poor dentures. 
Interpersonally, he maintained eye contact with the 
examiner. He appeared to attempt the tests required of him. 
However, he was emotional during much of my interview time, often 
becoming tearful and requiring time to regain his composure. Also, 
he had a tendency to get focused on specific issues or concerns 
and it was difficult for him to get back to the topic at hand. Insight 
appeared poor. He was oriented to person and place but was not 
consistently oriented to time. 
(ld. at 2-3.) 
Dr. Beaver then discussed Clinton's background and Clinton's ability to 
understand the legal process. (Id. at 3-5.) Dr. Beaver analyzed the degree of 
Clinton's mental illness and the level of Clinton's functional impairment by 
analyzing the neuropsychological test results. (ld. at 5-9.) Dr. Beaver's overall 
impressions of Clinton were that: 
Mr. Clinton presents as being quite impaired. He has poor 
hearing that interferes with communication. He appears to be 
relatively limited in his communication abilities even without the 
hearing problem. I suspect that historically, he has functioned in 
the low end of dull normal. This certainly would be consistent with 
his reported history of only attending school into the eighth grade 
and essentially being unable to read or write with any functional 
ability. 
He now presents with much greater difficulty. More 
specifically, he presents with poor ability to stay focused. He has 
significant difficulties with retaining new information. He is easily 
confused and overwhelmed. 
(Id. at 7.) 
Dr. Beaver diagnosed Clinton with Dementia and Adjustment Disorder 
with Depressed Mood. (Id.) Dr. Beaver stated that it was "difficult to determine 
what the source of [Clinton's] neurocognitive difficulties would be" and noted that 
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if "Clinton has a primary dementia such as the Alzheimer's type, I anticipate it will 
be extremely difficult to restore Mr. Clinton to a functional competence." (Id. at 7-
9.) 
However, Dr. Beaver ultimately concluded that Clinton was competent to 
stand trial after reviewing a videotape of Clinton's interview with law enforcement 
officers and audio recordings of Clinton's phone calls from jail. (10/13/10 
Psychological/Competency Evaluation Amended Report, pp.2-3.) Although Dr. 
Beaver was never able to completely rule out a primary dementia, Dr. Beaver 
was able to inform the district court of the severity of Clinton's mental illness, as 
well as Clinton's level of functional impairment. (ld. at 2-5.) Dr. Beaver was also 
able to analyze the treatment options available for Clinton's mental health 
condition. (Id. at 4-5.) 
In addition to the two Psychological/Competency Evaluation reports 
prepared by Dr. Beaver, the district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation and 
a social/sexual assessment. (PSI, pp.8, 15-36; R., pp.65-66.) The psychological 
information contained in those reports is extremely thorough. (PSI, pp.15-36.) 
During the psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston reviewed a considerable 
amount of information regarding Clinton's mental condition and Dr. Johnston 
used that information to determine Clinton's "DSM-IV diagnosis, risk level to re-
offend, capacity for treatment, recommendation regarding violent predator status, 
conclusions, and suggestions for management." (PSI, pp.24-26.) During the 
psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston administered three psychological tests in 
addition to the 16 previous psychological tests performed by Dr. Beaver, but the 
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new tests did not produce valid results due to "what appeared to be low 
intellectual functioning." (PSI, p.24.) Dr. Johnston analyzed Clinton's mental 
condition and psychological symptoms. (PSI, p.25.) Dr. Johnston diagnosed 
Clinton with Pedophilia, Sexual Abuse, Adjustment Disorder with Anxious Mood, 
and Borderline Intellectual Functioning (Possibly Mental Retardation). (PSI, 
pp.25-26.) Dr. Johnston noted that "individuals who have low intellectual 
functioning could sometimes act on their inappropriate sexual impulses purely 
based on incapacity to contain sexual desires, and not related to personality 
issues." (PSI, p.25.) Dr. Johnston concluded that Clinton poses a "high risk to 
re-offend" based on numerous psychological and sexual variables that Dr. 
Johnston considered. (PSI, pp.29-32.) 
After concluding that Clinton posed a high risk of reoffending, Dr. Johnston 
analyzed the potential benefit of treatment and discussed whether treatment was 
available for Clinton's mental condition. (PSI, pp.34-36.) Dr. Johnston 
recommended sexual offender treatment in a "structured environment" along with 
psychological measures and polygraph examinations to track the progress and 
honesty of Clinton during treatment. (PSI, pp.34-36.) However, Dr. Johnston 
noted that Clinton's "limited intellect might create limitations regarding his 
capacity to comprehend topics discussed in treatment and apply them to his life." 
(PSI, p.33.) 
Despite all of the psychological information regarding Clinton's mental 
condition that the district court had before it prior to sentencing, Clinton claims 
that the district court was required to sua sponte order an additional mental 
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health evaluation because "there never was a mental health evaluation which 
actually diagnosed the extent of Mr. Clinton's dementia." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) 
Clinton primarily bases this argument on his opinion that the district court denied 
his "request for probation or a period of retained jurisdiction based solely on Mr. 
Clinton's 'dementia,' and the perceived negative impact it would have on his 
amenability to treatment." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Clinton's argument is without 
merit. 
The specific extent of Clinton's dementia was not a "significant factor at 
sentencing" because it was not a "key underlying factor in the defendant's 
commission of the crime." See State v. Shultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288, 233 P.3d 
732, 735 (Ct. App. 2010) (stating that "raJlthough not exclusive, a defendant's 
mental condition can be a significant factor at sentencing when. that condition 
may be a key underlying factor in the defendant's commission of the crime, 
especially when the actions are a serious departure from the defendant's history 
and character."). The crime at issue here was not a departure from Clinton's 
history or character in any way. Clinton was previously convicted of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Under 16,6 which is the same crime he was convicted of in 
this case. (PSI, pp.4-5.) His prior offense was "part of a continuing pattern of 
behavior" that consisted of Clinton having sexual contact with children and that 
pattern of conduct continued when he committed the instant offense. (PSI, 
p.117.) Clinton has a "willingness to groom and manipulate in order to satisfy his 
6 During the investigation of that crime, Clinton told law enforcement officers that 
he "had sex with approximately 50 different children" and he "advised that he has 
had a problem with children for more than 20 years and was relieved when he 
was finally able to tell someone about his problems." (PSI, p.138.) 
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sexual desires" and "his most recent inappropriate sexual behavior was highly 
concerning, and suggested fairly deep-seated attitudes that supported child 
molestation, beliefs that support manipulation of others, poor impulse control, 
sexual entitlement, and callousness towards his victim." (PSI, p.31.) 
Furthermore, even assuming that the Extent of Clinton's dementia was a 
significant factor at sentencing, the district court did not manifestly disregard 
I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 because it had had ample evidence regarding 
Clinton's mental condition and the district court appropriately considered 
Clinton's mental condition as it related to Clinton's prospects for rehabilitation. 
(See Tr., p.47, L.12 - p.55, L.5.; see also Order Denying Motion for 
Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2 (augmentation). As stated recently by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Windom: 
When evaluating the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, trial 
judges are asked to make a probabilistic determination of a human 
being's likely future behavior. The reality is that a sentencing judge 
will never possess sufficient information about the defendant's 
character, life circumstances and past behavior so as to project 
future behavior with unerring accuracy. To the contrary, the factual 
determination of the defendant's probability of re-offense will always 
be based upon limited data. This extraordinarily difficult task is 
made more difficult because it is merely one factor to be considered 
by the sentencing judge-and a subordinate consideration at that. 
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359,363,304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956) 
("Rehabilitation is not the controlling consideration . . ., The 
primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the 
good order and protection of society."). 
150 Idaho 873,253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011). 
It was clear from both the competency evaluation and the psychosexual 
evaluation that Clinton's possible dementia and his low intellectual functioning 
could have an effect on Clinton's prospects for rehabilitation. However, the 
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district court never found that Clinton's dementia was "untreatable" as Clinton 
argues. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Although the district court expressed its 
concerns about Clinton's ability to control his impulses and his ability to be 
rehabilitated, the district court followed Dr. Johnston's suggestions and 
recommended treatment in a "secure facility" where Clinton "would not have any 
access to children." (Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.54, L.10; PSI, p.32.) The district court did 
not "solely focus[] on Mr. Clinton's possible dementia when it refused his request 
for probation or period of retained jurisdiction." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) The 
district court denied Clinton's request for probation primarily out of concern for 
the safety of the community and the district court denied his request for a rider 
because the district court did not think a rider would be appropriate based on 
Clinton's prior criminal history. (Tr., p.52, Ls.3-7; p.53, Ls.6-10.) As such, it was 
unnecessary for the district court to order an additional psychological evaluation 
and the district court did not manifestly disregard I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522. 
Clinton next relies on State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 229 P.3d 1179 
(Ct. App. 2010), for his contention that the district court erred when it failed to sua 
sponte order an additional mental health evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) 
However, that case is distinguishable. In Jockumsen, the district court did not 
order any psychological evaluations prior to sentencing other than the 
defendant's competency evaluations. 148 Idaho at 819, 229 P.3d at 1181. The 
district court pronounced a sentence, but expressed a need for additional 
information on the defendant's mental health and decided to retain jurisdiction for 
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180 days and request a mental health evaluation during the retained jurisdiction 
period. kl 
After determining that the defendant's mental condition was a significant 
factor for sentencing, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the district court did 
not sufficiently comply with I.C. § 19-2522 because that "statute requires that the 
evaluation be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will have the 
benefit of the evaluator's insights in fashioning an appropriate sentence." kl at 
823, 229 P.3d at 1185 (emphasis original). 
Here, the district court had significantly more information regarding 
Clinton's mental condition than the district court in Jockumsen had regarding the 
defendant. In addition to two psychological/competency evaluation reports, the 
district court had a comprehensive psychosexual evaluation and a social/sexual 
assessment. Furthermore, the district court had all of these psychological 
evaluations prior to sentencing. Therefore, the holding in Jockumsen is 
inapplicable to the facts of this case 
Clinton's claim that the district court should have sua sponte ordered an 
additional psychological evaluation pursuant to I. C. § 19-2522 should not be 
considered on appeal because there is neither a claim nor a showing of 
fundamental error. The psychological evaluations that the district court ordered 
prior to sentencing were more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 
19-2522. Even if this Court were to apply the "manifest disregard" standard and 
review non-fundamental error in the absence of an objection, Clinton has failed to 
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show that the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 or I.C. § 19-2522 in 
light of the facts shown in the record. 
II. 
Clinton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Clinton asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
a unified sentence of 20 years with three years fixed. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
Clinton has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 
(2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 
391 (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). 
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C. Clinton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencing Discretion 
Clinton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the 
underlying sentence of 20 years with three years fixed executed in light of his 
mental health issues, his amenability to treatment, support from friends, and his 
employment background. (Appel/ant's brief, pp.16-20.) 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appel/ant 
must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting 
society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution. 19.,. 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the 
objectives of sentencing, the seriousness of Clinton's offense, his criminal history 
and the danger he presents to children in the community. (Order Denying Motion 
for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, pp.1-2 (augmentation); Tr., pA7, L.12 - p.50, 
L.22.) The district court also considered Clinton's amenability to treatment, his 
employment history, and his "very high risk to reoffend." (Tr., p.50, L.23 - p.53, 
L.23.) Clinton's criminal history includes a prior conviction for Lewd Conduct with 
a Minor Under 16. (PSI, ppA-5.) That offense was "part of a continuing pattern 
of behavior" that consisted of Clinton having "anal/genital contact, oral/genital 
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contact and attempted intercourse" with at least three children? (PSI, p.117.) In 
addition to those victims, Clinton admitted to molesting about 50 children in over 
a hundred incidents. (PSI, p.118.) Clinton provided the names of several of 
those children and "advised that he generally prefers rectal sex with boys." (PSI, 
p.134.) Clinton had access to the children "through family and employment with 
a carnivaL" (PSI, p.9.) 
During Clinton's psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Johnston asked Clinton if he 
believed his victims had the potential for negative consequences because of their 
sexual interactions with Clinton. (PSI, p.27.) Clinton responded, "[t]hat's a hard 
one to figure out. I think they might just forget about it." (PSI, p.27.) Dr. 
Johnston determined that Clinton poses a "high risk" to reoffend based, in part, 
on Clinton's "pedophilia and propensity towards sexual abuse." (PSI, pp.29-31.) 
Dr Johnston stated: 
He seemed sexually attracted to both male and female children, 
coupled with an incapacity to contain his urges, in addition to 
willingness to groom and manipUlate in order to satisfy his sexual 
desires. Furthermore, one would expect that after ten years of 
treatment he would have better insight and capacity to contain 
these urges if such were to develop. Consequently, his most 
recent inappropriate sexual behavior was highly concerning, and 
suggested fairly deep-seated attitudes that supported child 
molestation, beliefs that support manipulation of others, poor 
impulse control, sexual entitlement, and callousness towards his 
victim .... 
(PSI, p.31.) Based on Clinton's high risk of reoffending, Dr. Johnston 
recommended that Clinton should be required to enroll in sexual offender 
7 Clinton was accused of sexually abusing five children. (PSI, p.117.) Clinton 
admitted to sexually abusing three of the children, but "stated he could not recall 
any abuse occurring with" the other two children. (PSI, p.117). 
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treatment in a "structured environment." (PSI, p.34.) However, Dr. Johnston 
noted that "[c]onsidering the examinee had previously participated in ten years of 
sexual offender treatment and still re-offended, in addition to taking into account 
his limited intellect, there were concerns regarding how much more he could 
learn from sexual offender treatment." (PSI, p.33.) 
The presentence investigator recommended: 
At the court's discretion a lengthy period of incarceration 
would protect society, deter Mr. Clinton from sexually offending 
children, hold him accountable for his actions against this victim, 
and provide the opportunity for Mr. Clinton to participate in 
counseling and treatment in a secure environment. 
(PSI, p.1 D.) 
At Clinton's sentencing hearing, the district court stated: 
I think it's really a great blessing that the child in this case was 
comfortable enough to tell somebody else what was going on so 
that we could stop something that looks like it's likely to be a very 
serious problem. 
As far as we know, that problem is not more extensive, but 
it's very worrisome, because Mr. Clinton did have a significant 
pattern. It is very possible that the treatment was successful for a 
while. 
But Mr. Clinton has been diagnosed by Dr. Johnston with 
having a serious level of this problem, which is an Axis I diagnosis 
of pedophilia. Under all circumstances, even with people who are 
younger and mentally sounder, that's a terrible diagnosis. It's a 
terrible diagnosis as far as risk to the community. 
Dr. Johnston says that he presents a very high risk to 
reoffend. 
(Tr., p.5D, Ls.5-24.) The district court also stated: 
what we have right now is a very serious issue that the defendant is 
suffering from dementia, which will probably worsen his ability to 
understand and internalize additional counseling. If the prior 
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counseling was successful, it appears that success appears to --
that success appears to be dimming now. 
Unfortunately, I think this is a very risky picture. It really 
looks like possibly the emerging dementia, coupled with pedophiliac 
disposition, is just -- is at a worsening place, and that's what would 
be my assessment, based on what's before me. And that, at best, 
he would have to start treatment in a secure facility. 
It's not clear if the treatment can be successful, based upon 
his deteriorating condition. 
And it is clear that he presents a risk to children. He is a 
proven risk to children in the past._ He is a proven risk to children in 
the near past. And where he lives is a place where he's likely to be 
exposed to other children. 
And besides which I think his abilities to control his impulses, 
which never was as strong as some people with the sturdier 
intellectual gifts, but it appears that he was able to control his 
impulses. 
I'm afraid that what's going on for whatever reason appears 
to be lessening his ability to control his impulses. So I think it's 
unfortunate, but I think we have limited options. 
(Tr., p.51, L.11 - p.52, L.16.) The district court did not "see a rider with the sexual 
offender assessment group as being an appropriate placement in this case" 
because "that is more designed for people who are coming into the system for 
the first time." (Tr., p.53, Ls.6-10.) 
In denying Clinton's motion for reduction of sentence under I.CR. 35, the 
district court further explained the reasoning behind the sentence imposed: 
The defendant is a pedophile. He has extremely serious prior 
convictions for lewd conduct with an eight year old boy. He has 
admitted to molesting two other little boys. He told officers at one 
point that he had sex with fifty children. In this case, he lured a little 
girl into his trailer and played "touching games" with her which 
involved manual to genital contact. He says he is attracted to 
children and fantasizes about sex with little girls all of the time. He 
represents a grave risk to the safety of children. The Court's 
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sentence was very reasonable and fair and was designed to protect 
the most vulnerable members of the community. 
(Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Under ICR 35, p.2 (augmentation).) 
The district court appropriately determined that a period of incarceration 
was necessary to protect the public and imposed a reasonable sentence. The 
sentence imposed was appropriate in light of the seriousness of Clinton's 
offense, his lack of remorse, and the danger he poses to society. Given any 
reasonable view of the facts, Clinton has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Clinton's conviction and 
sentence. 
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